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PRE-ELECTION JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
INITIATIVE PETITIONS: AN
UNREASONABLE LIMITATION ON
POLITICAL SPEECH
I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of government in the United States is one of conflict
between the radical concepts of republicanism and democracy on one
hand, and the pragmatic needs of providing a stable, effective government on the other.' "Rule by the people" evokes images of freedom
and self-determination, but it also speaks of administrative chaos.
Nevertheless, citizens of the United States are the sovereign power
from which all government power is derived. This power is usually
administered through a delayed reactionary process consisting of election, representation, and accountability. However, sometimes the
power of popular sovereignty flows directly into law without the
buffer of representation. This direct conduit is the initiative petition.'
When individuals or groups use the initiative petition to bring a
proposed law before the electorate, 2 they intend to use direct democracy to accomplish what a representative government may be hesitant
or unwilling to do.3 Even though elected legislators are ostensibly the
agents of their constituencies, other factors play a role in their effectiveness as lawmakers. Political gamesmanship, concerns about alienating a subgroup, and even self-dealing may stand in the way of
legislation among elected officials.
However, the initiative process may also run afoul of political and
social barriers. Organizers of these petitions expect to encounter
1. The term "initiative petition" refers to "[a]n electoral process whereby designated per-

centages of the electorate may initiate legislative or constitutional changes through filing formal
petitions to be acted on by the legislature or the total electorate." BLACK'S LAW DiCrnONARY

784 (6th ed. 1990). Groups propose bills
and laws which are approved by signatories to the
petition and then by voters at an election. These proposals become law independent of any

legislative assembly. Id
A referendum is a particular type of initiative which proposes an amendment to constitutional provisions, ld at 1281.
2. "Electorate" is defined as a "body of people entitled to vote." WEBs-ER'S NiNTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 400 (9th ed. 1990).

3. The subjects of initiative petitions tend to be controversial, divisive issues such as abortion, liquor laws, gambling, and congressional term limits.
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resistance from the opposition and even apathy among their supporters. The dynamics of direct democracy make such obstacles a natural
part of the process. However, neither the theoretical concept of direct
democracy nor the procedural model adopted in this state anticipate
that an initiative petition could come under the scrutiny and potential
disapproval by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Judicial review of initiative petitions has been discussed since
their inception,4 but only in the last twenty years has the highest court
in Oklahoma crossed its own boundaries, as well as those dictated by
sound judgment, to foray into what may be the most damaging form
of judicial advocacy a court could practice.- When a court reviews an
initiative during the petition stage, regardless of the auspices used to
justify its action, the carefully structured sole example of pure democracy in our system of government loses its meaning.
This comment will examine the history of initiative petitions and
judicial review in Oklahoma, focusing on the key decisions where the
Oklahoma Supreme Court shifted from judicial restraint. Based on an
analysis of the reasoning behind the shift, this comment advocates the
court's return to its original policies of judicial restraint regarding initiative petitions.
II. THE

INITIATIVE PETITION

A. Background
The initiative petition is an exercise in direct democracy.6 To a
great extent, the Progressive Movement of the early twentieth century
paved the way for the adoption of initiative processes in several state
constitutions.7 Even though the Progressives were responsible for
much of the increased federal involvement in areas of social and economic activity,8 the initiative petition reflected their "belief that direct
4. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra parts IlI.C-E.
6. William Lawton Teague, Jr., Comment, Pre-Election ConstitutionalReview of Initiative
Petitions: A Pox on Vox Populi?, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rav. 201, 202 (1992) (citing DAVID B.
MAGLEBY, DIREcr LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(1984)).
7. Id. "During the ten years from 1898 to 1908, seven states incorporated initiative petition provisions in their respective constitutions: South Dakota, 1898; Utah, 1900; Oregon, 1902;
Montana, 1906; Oklahoma, 1907; Maine, 1908; Missouri, 1908." Id. (citing Jefferson B. Fordham
& Russell Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OHIO ST. L.. 495, 496 n.8 (1950)).
8. KERMrr L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209 (1989). The

most notable examples of the Progressives' impact on the extension of federal power in social
and economic relations are the Progressive Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: (1) Sixteenth
(granting Congress the power to impose an income tax); (2) Seventeenth (disrupting local party
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democracy is preferable to government by politicians and
legislators." 9
Any form of direct democracy faces opposition from a long line
of distinguished critics. Most notably, James Madison saw the problem of direct democracy rooted in the tendency of the populace to
split into factions among which "common passion or interest will, in
almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole," thus leaving no
protection for the minority. 10 Where the populace controlled government directly, there would be an unstable society where property and
liberty were in constant peril." He also saw the populace, as a whole,
unqualified to directly participate in government due to their lack of
education and thoughtfulness about important issues.' 2 In his view,
representative government would "refine and enlarge the public views
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the truest interest of their country
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations."' 3
The Constitution of the State of Oklahoma reflects more of the
Progressive influence than the teaching of James Madison. Drafted
during a radical shift in American economic and social development,
the Oklahoma Constitution places emphasis on the precept that "[a]ll
political power is inherent in the people." 4 As a practical manifestation of this ideal, the constitution includes provisions which expressly
grant the right to initiative and referendum.' 5 Soon after the constitution's adoption, the initiative petition in Oklahoma withstood a claim
control over elections by requiring popular rather than state legislative elections of United States
Senators); (3) Eighteenth (prohibiting the sale and transportation of alcoholic beverages); and
(4) Nineteenth (prohibiting gender-based discrimination in voting). Id.
9. Teague, supra note 6, at 202.
10. GaomFRv R. STONE ET AL., CONSTTTIONAL LAW 13 (2d ed. 1991) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (James Madison)). Throughout the series of documents known as The Federalist
Papers, written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, the principles of republicanism were expounded during the debate leading up to the Constitution. Id. at 7.

11. Id.
12. See supra text accompanying note 9.
13. STONE, supra note 10, at 13 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (James Madison)).
14. OKLA. CON ST. art. H, § 1. The section continues:
[A]nd government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it: Provided such change be not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States.

Id.
15. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2. The section states
The first power reserved by the people is the initiative, and eight per centum of the
legal voters shall have the right to propose any legislative measure, and fifteen per
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that it conflicted with article IV, section 4 of the United States
Constitution.16
B.

The Procedure in Oklahoma

Once proponents of an initiative measure have drafted a petition,
they must file it with the Secretary of State. 7 The Secretary of State
reviews the form of the petition and prepares copies with signature
sheets attached.' The proponents have ninety days from the date of
filing to circulate these copies and acquire the necessary number of
signatures.19 When an initiative petition proposes a statute, the proponents must collect signatures equal to eight percent of the votes cast
at the last general election. 20 If the petition proposes an amendment
to the constitution, the requirement increases to fifteen percent.2 '
The proponents must submit the signed petitions to the Secretary
of State by the end of a ninety day period for verification of the signatures.22 The Secretary of State then makes or causes to be made a
physical count of the number of signatures.' The Secretary of State
centum of the legal voters shall have the right to propose amendments to the Constitution by petition, and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so
proposed. The second power is the referendum, and it may be ordered (except as to
laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety),
either by petition signed by five per centum of the legal voters or by the Legislature as
other bills are enacted. The ratio and per centum of legal voters hereinbefore stated
shall be based upon the total number of votes cast at the last general election for the
State office receiving the highest number of votes at such election.
Id.
16. Ex parte Wagner, 95 P. 435 (Okla. 1908).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(A) (Supp. 1993). More precisely, the statute requires that:
When a citizen or citizens desire to circulate a petition initiating a proposition of any
nature, whether to become a statute law or an amendment to the Constitution, or for
the purpose of invoking a referendum upon legislative enactments, such citizen or citizens shall, when such petition is prepared, and before the same is circulated or signed
by electors, file a true and exact copy of same in the office of the Secretary of State ....
Id.
18. Stan P. Guerin, Comment, Pre-ElectionJudicialReview: The Right Choice, 17 OKLA.
Crr U. L. REv. 221,224 (1992) (citing 3. Michael Medina, The Emergency Clause andthe Referendum in Oklahoma: CurrentStatus and Needed Reform, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 401, 408 (1990)).
19. OKrA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(A) (Supp. 1993).

20. OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2. The exact number of votes from the last general election is
calculated based on the votes "for the state office receiving the highest number of votes at such
election." OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(C)(2) (Supp. 1993).
21. OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2.

22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(A) (Supp. 1993). The Secretary of State verifies that information required by statute is provided. Id § 6. "The electors shall sign their legally-registered
name, their address or post office box, and the name of the county in which they reside. Any
petition not filed in accordance with this provision shall not be considered." Id. § 8(A).
23. Id. § 6.1(A). However, after the Secretary of State certifies the count, "the Supreme
Court [makes] the determination of numerical sufficiency or insufficiency of the signatures
counted by the Secretary of State." Id § 8(C)(2).
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publishes the results of this count, starting a ten day time period during which protests to the petition or objections to the count may be
filed. 2 4 If a protest or objection is filed within this time, the supreme
court will hear arguments for and against the sufficiency of the motion
under the statutes.'

Unless the provisions of section 8 are followed,

the court will not consider the protests or objections.z6
As part of the procedural level of sufficiency, an initiative must
meet three threshold tests.27 The initiative petition must meet the sine
qua non' requirements for submission,29 address only a single subject,3 0 and embrace content appropriate for lawmaking by the people.3 Once these threshold requirements have been satisfied, the
proposal may be placed on the ballot
of the next general election for a
32
vote by the citizens of the state.
III. JurIciAL REVIEW OF INITIATIVE PETITIONS
A.

Background

An initiative that has been processed according to the laws of the
state and approved by a vote of the people becomes law?33 At that
point, it becomes indistinguishable from laws enacted by the legisla35
ture.3 4 Accordingly, the long-standing tradition of judicial review
24. Id. § 8(C)(2). The statute further states that:
Upon order of the Supreme Court [of the state] it shall be the duty of the Secretary of
State to forthwith cause to be published, in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the state, a notice of such filing and the apparent sufficiency or insufficiency
thereof and notice that any citizen or citizens of the state may file a protest to the
petition or an objection to the count made by the Secretary of State, by written notice
to the Supreme Court of the state and to the proponent or proponents filing the petition, said protest to be filed within ten (10) days after publication.
id.
25. L § 8(E)-(F). The hearing will be scheduled "not less than ten (10) days [after the
filing of the protest]." Id. § 8(F).
26. Id. § 8(G). One notable provision allows a party to revive an abandoned protest within
five days of its withdrawal. Id.
27. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 347, State Question No. 639, 813 P.2d 1019, 1039
(Okla. 1991) (Opala, J., concurring) (giving the threshold tests as articulated by Justice Opala).
28. Sine qua non is defined as "that without which the thing cannot be." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Requirements are defined by statute. See generally OmA. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 1-25 (1991 &
Supp. 1993).
30. In re Initiative Petition No. 344, State Question No. 630,797 P.2d 326,330 (Okla. 1990);
In re Initiative Petition No. 342, State Question No. 628, 797 P.2d 331, 333 (Okla. 1990).
31. In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Numbered
74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3 (Okla. 1975) [hereinafter Norman].
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 12, 25 (1991).
33. Guerin, supra note 18, at 223.
34. Guerin, supra note 18, at 223.
35. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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applies just as surely to the law by initiative as it does to the law by
legislation.36 If a party brings a complaint alleging the law to be invalid on constitutional grounds, the judicial branch may properly address that claim.3 7
The law is not nearly as clear when a court attempts to exercise
judicial review of the content of an initiative before it has reached the
electorate for a vote. As discussed in this context, judicial review
does not refer to a review of the initiative petition's compliance with
procedural rules under the applicable state statutes.39 Instead, the review at issue in this Comment examines the content of an initiative
and determines its constitutionality.
A majority of jurisdictions do not allow pre-election judicial review of initiatives on substantive grounds.40 These jurisdictions exercise judicial restraint.4 ' The exercise of such restraint reflects the fact
that an initiative petition is not yet within the purview of either the
judicial or executive branches.42 Only after the initiative is voted into
law does the possibility of judicial review arise.43
In the minority of jurisdictions where pre-election judicial review
is practiced or recognized,' the rationales for review include predictability in the review process, prevention of fiscal waste, limiting abuse
36. See Oklahomans for Modem Alcoholic Beverage Controls v. Shelton, 501 P.2d 1089,
1095 (Okla. 1972) (Hodges, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. See discussion infra part III.E.2.
38. See, eg., Guerin, supra note 18, at 221; Teague, supra note 6, at 203-04.
39. Review of sufficiency examines the validity of signatures, the number of signatures,
form of the petition, filing procedures, and other procedural items addressed by statute. See
generally OL.A. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 1-25 (1991 & Supp. 1993).

40. Guerin, supra note 18, at 221 & n.6 (citing Broucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456,460 n.13
(Alaska 1974), overruled on othergrounds by McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska
1988); Mlson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1987); City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 293
P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. 1956) (en banc); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115,
127 (Mass. 1946); Leininger v. Alger, 26 N.W.2d 348,353 (Mich. 1947); Anderson v. Byrne, 242
N.W. 687, 692 (N.D. 1932); State ex reL Cramer v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Ohio 1983)
(per curiam); Oregon AFL-CIO v. Weldon, 473 P.2d 664, 667 (Or. 1970); State ex rel. O'Connell
v. Krammer, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (Wash. 1968) (en banc)).
41. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
42. See James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election JudicialReview of Initiafives and Referendums, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 298, 304-05 (1989).
43. Even after an initiative becomes law, standing for judicial review requires that the constitutional requirements of standing be met. See discussion infra part III.E.2.
44. Guerin, supra note 18, at 221-22 & n.6 (citing Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991,
996 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264,279 (E.D. Wis. 1968); whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 n.5 (Alaska 1980); Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 256
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984); Coalition for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. 1976) (per curiam); St. Paul
Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (Minn. 1979); State ex rel.
Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7,8 (Mo. 1983) (en bane); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 394 P.2d 761,
763-64 (Mont. 1964) (per curiam)).
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of the system by special-interest groups, protecting minority rights,
and promoting judicial economy.45 However, as the history of this issue in Oklahoma emphasizes,46 and as the majority of jurisdictions
practicing judicial restraint must have realized,4' the alleged benefits
of pre-election review cannot be examined in the abstract. These benefits must be4 viewed in the larger context of political speech and direct
democracy.
B. Threadgill: Oklahoma's Foundationfor Pre-Election Judicial
Review
Oklahoma articulated its initial approach to judicial review of initiative petitions in Threadgill v. Cross.4 9 The Oklahoma Secretary of

State asserted that a petition proposing an amendment to the constitution was facially invalid; therefore, he did not need to proceed with
filing the initiative.-5 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an initiative petition cannot be reviewed for constitutionality by the judicial
branch in the pre-election phase of its consideration. 5 '
The court declared that citizens involved in the initiative petition
process "are exercising a legislative power... and, while so engaged,
they constitute part of the legislative department of the state. ' 52 Accordingly, the court must not intrude upon this process since "[a]n act
of the [legislature] is clothed with the presumption that it is valid, and
its constitutionality will not be considered and determined by the
courts as a hypothetical question."5 3
The Threadgill court went on to state that pre-election review of
an initiative petition would be a violation of the separation of powers54 as mandated in the Oklahoma Constitution.55 The separation of
45. Guerin, supra note 18, at 232.

46. See infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
47. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 42, at 304.
48. See infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text.
49. 109 P. 558 (Okla. 1910). The Oklahoma Supreme Court issued the decision in a mandamus proceeding to compel the Secretary of State to file initiative petitions so they could be
forwarded to a vote of the people. The State argued that the initiative in question would be void
upon ratification because it violated the Federal Constitution. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 562. Clearly, Justice Hayes did not propose that citizens so engaged are actually
legislators. The statement in the context of his opinion indicates an analogy between the two
rather than any attempt to equate them. See also Teague, supra note 6, at 204.
53. Threadgill,109 P. at 559. See also Teague supra note 6, at 204.
54. See State ex reL Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 166 N.E. 407,410 (Ohio 1929), aff'd,
281 U.S. 74 (1930); see also THE FEDERAL.sT Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison).
55. OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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powers doctrine dictates that each branch of government has a distinct
role balanced against the roles of the other branches.56 A government
practicing this doctrine is inherently inefficient since each branch must
be allowed to act within the scope of its role before the other branches
can step in to provide balance. 57 Despite this inefficiency, it is the
accepted law of the land. Accordingly, even though interference by
the judicial branch may help the legislature avoid the wasted time and
expense of passing a law that is unconstitutional on its face, our system of government does not allow such expediency. 58
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in
Threadgillwhere it held that the judiciary may not take the expedient
course of intercepting a facially unconstitutional initiative because it is
not the course allowed by our present form of government.59 In the
present system, the legislative department (or the citizenry acting in
its stead) determines what passes into law. 60 Only when someone asserts that the law affects them and is invalid does the judicial department gain the power to review that law. 6
C. Norman: The Departurefrom Precedent and Reason
The Threadgill rule prevailed in Oklahoma law until the early
1970s.62 In 1972, Oklahomans for Modern Alcoholic Beverage Controls v. Shelton63 marked the final majority decision adhering to the
rule from Threadgill.6r Justice Hodges' dissent in that case 65 articulated the argument that would soon end an era of judicial restraint
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
57. Threadgill,109 P. at 562. The court stated that:
[A] government all of whose powers are administered by one department may be administered with less expense than a government of the kind existing in this state and in
the other states of the Union, in which the powers are exercised by the different departments; but, if so, it must be presumed that the people in adopting the present form of
government did so with knowledge of that fact ....
lad
58. Id

59. Id
60. Id
61. Id. The court states that the legislature decides what passes into law "leaving it to the
other departments to question or determine the validity of such laws only when they come to be
enforced against some one [sic] whose rights they affect." Id at 563.

62. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 259, State Question No. 376, 316 P.2d 139 (Okla.
1957); In re Initiative Petitions Nos. 112,114, 117,118, 153, 6 P.2d 703 (Okla. 1931); McAlister v.
State, 221 P. 779 (Okla. 1923).
63. 501 P.2d 1089 (Okla. 1972).

64. Iad at 1095 (refusing to hear a petition challenging the constitutionality of an initiative
petition).
65. Id (Hodges, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and usher in a continuing struggle to justify unwarranted judicial activism.66 He proposed saving the expense of unnecessary elections by
conducting pre-election judicial review to invalidate initiatives unconstitutional on their face prior to an election. 67
Justice Hodges' unconstitutional 68 yet apparently persuasive view
achieved majority status in In re Supreme CourtAdjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Numbered 74-1 & 74-2.69 The 1975
majority opinion by Justice Lavender declared that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would conduct a content-based pre-election review of
proposed initiatives to avoid "a costly and unnecessary election."70
The court's justification for this sudden departure from Threadgill
was the 1973 amendment to section 8 of title 34 of the Oklahoma Statutes.' Where this amendment merely replaced "Secretary of State"
with "Supreme Court" as the entity responsible for certain administrative duties, the Norman court interpreted these changes as legislative
permission to exercise full judicial authority.72 Under its rationale,
the court infers from the amended section 8 the authority to review
initiatives prior to election for constitutional substance as well as procedural form. 73
The court supports this reading of the 1973 amendment under the
separation of powers doctrine.74 When the Secretary of State had the
66. See discussion infra part I.D.
67. Shelton, 501 P.2d at 1095 (Hodges, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (giving
no reasoning, support, or justification for this view beyond its cost-saving aspect).
68. See Michael J. Farrell, Note, The Judiciaryand PopularDemocracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Priorto Elections?, 53 FoRDHAM L. REvIEw 919, 932 (1985).

69. 534 P.2d 3 (Okla. 1975).
70. Id.at 8. Unlike Hodges' proposal, the Norman decision did not limit this review to
initiatives that were clearly unconstitutional on their face. See also Teague supra note 6, at 205
n.42.
71. Initiative and Referendum-Petition-Hearing Act, 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 78, § 1
(current version codified at OaA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(C)(2), (F)-(H) (Supp. 1993)) (deleting the
provisions in section 8 for protest to the Secretary of State and adding provisions for all protests
to be before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma).
72. Norman, 534 P.2d at 8. In Norman the court said:
Under present initiative procedure, 34 O.S.Supp.1973 § 8 [the amended form of OKLA.
STAT. tit. 34, § 8], administrative duties formerly placed on administrative officials have
been legislated directly to this court. We believe this court is not limited solely to the
duties of an administrative officer or act. It may consider the constitutionality of matters to be considered under the initiative and referendum process as to procedure form
and subject matter, when raised, and if in this court [sic] opinion such a determination
could prevent a costly and unnecessary election.
Id.
73. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
74. See In re Initiative Petition No. 358, State Question No. 658, 870 P.2d 782, 785 (Okla.
1994) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine "prevents the Legislature from enjoining
purely administrative duties upon this Court").
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jot? of hearing protests, it was as an administrative officer performing
an administrative duty.75 However, when the court was given this
duty, shifting the responsibility from administrative to judicial hands,
the Norman decision implied a concurrent increase in the review prescribed by section 8.76
An analysis of this interpretation of the duties under title 34, section 8 reveals that the court has fabricated its authority from whole
cloth. Title 34, section 8 is a narrowly drawn statute which authorizes
the Oklahoma Supreme Court to review the form of an initiative petition.7 7 Somehow, "form" has been interpreted to mean "substance."
The Norman interpretation also expressly contradicts case law.
In Threadgill, the court expressly prohibited the Secretary of State
from conducting pre-election constitutional review of an initiative.78
Therefore, it follows that the amendment to section 8 merely delegated to the court those duties previously allowed to the Secretary of
State and carried with it the limitation from Threadgill. Moreover, the
court in Threadgillheld that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited an executive officer, the Secretary of State, from doing what the
courts could not do, which was to "pass upon the validity of the proposed measure and stay the election. ' 79 Nevertheless, the Norman
court forged ahead into unsubstantiated legal interpretation and bestowed upon itself certain powers; powers expressly denied to the Secretary of State and to the court both by statute and by Threadgill.
D. Post-NormanRulings: Justifying ConstitutionalReview
1. Preventing Costly and Unnecessary Elections
Although the Norman court primarily based its departure from
Threadgill on its interpretation of the amended title 34, section 8 and
the separation of powers doctrine, 0 the justification for pre-election
constitutional review of initiative petitions most widely expressed in
the subsequent decisions has been to "prevent costly and unnecessary
This interpretation of the 1973 amendment to OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8 under the separation
of powers doctrine does not consider that the duties originally given to the Secretary of State
resembled judicial rather than administrative acts.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 8(G) (Supp. 1993) (reading in part: "[a]fter such hearing the
Supreme Court of the state shall decide whether such petition be in form as required by the
statutes.") (emphasis added).
78. Threadgill v. Cross, 109 P. 558, 562 (Okla. 1910).
79. Id.
80, See supra notes 54, 74 and accompanying text.
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elections."'" For example, in In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State
Question No. 642,1 the majority characterizes the vote on a "facially"
unconstitutional initiative as "at best... an expensive non-binding
83
public opinion poll.
The "costly" argument cited in these decisions does not specify
where the cost occurs, does not offer an estimate of how much it will
be in dollar figures, and most importantly, does not explain how much
cost is required to outweigh the right to petition for an initiative and
place it before the electorate for their decision. 4 As Justice Wilson
observed in In re Initiative Petition No. 349,5 the court states its
"costly" justification "without a single allegation nor any evidence.18 6
Instead, the court relies on "popular information,"' and the unsubstantiated "common wisdom"" s that would barely be appropriate in a
private debate among colleagues, let alone in a line of majority opinions issued by the highest court of a state.8 9
When an initiative proposal goes before the people in the form of
a petition, part of the approval being sought from the electorate is to
place the proposal on a ballot. 90 All that is needed to decide that the
voters are prepared to bear the cost of the election is the approval of
at least eight percent of the voting public. 91 Since it does not appear
in the applicable statutes, further review of the expense of the election
becomes yet another aspect of the powers the court has created for
itself.92
As for the cost itself, the vote on an initiative proposal can occur
at any regular election.93 Therefore, the only expense involving state
81. In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Numbered
74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla. 1975) (holding that the Court had authority to "consider the
constitutionality of matters to be considered under the initiative and referendum process as to
procedure form and subject matter, when raised, and if in this court [sic] opinion such a determination could prevent a costly and unnecessary election").
82. 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
83. Id. at 12 (noting that "[w]ere we to allow the initiative to be submitted to the people, a
costly, fruitless, and useless election would take place").
84. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 1-25 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
85. 838 P.2d 1, 18 (Okla. 1992) (Wilson, J., dissenting in part).
86. Id. at n.14.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 18. The court's reliance on the "costly" argument without further support is akin
to it simply stating "everyone knows it is costly."
89. See, e.g., id. at 12; In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman,
Okla. Numbered 74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla. 1975).
90. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 25 (1991).
91. OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2.

92. See Norman, 534 P.2d at 3; discussion supra part III.C.
93. OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, § 25 (1991).
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funds is the printing of the proposal on the ballot. In the case of Initiative Petition No. 349, the ballot proposal was one-hundred and fortyone words. 94 Granted, printing costs vary, and even the advent of
computer-assisted publishing has not eliminated all cost from such a
task. However, printing a long paragraph on an existing ballot to be
delivered at an already scheduled election does not appear on its face
to be a great financial burden for the state.
Perhaps the cost referred to by the court is that borne by the
proponents and opponents who will surely advertise and publicize
their distinct views in anticipation of an election. 95 If this is the case,
then the court has unquestionably overstepped its bounds and ven96
tured into the mire of paternalism.
The court also seeks to bolster its rationale for pre-election constitutional review of initiative petitions by alleging that the review
helps avoid "unnecessary" elections when the court strikes facially unconstitutional initiative proposals. 97 The court has held that pre-election review under Norman "strengthens rather than impairs the
initiative process"98 by removing from possible consideration any proposals that are contrary to existing constitutional law, and therefore
have no potential to be valid law.9 9 Under this view, votes on a proposal that challenges current law would ultimately be "meaningless
acts in an elaborate charade."'1°
According to the majority view, the same initiative process that is
"precious" and one the court is "zealous to preserve to the fullest
measure of the spirit and the letter of the law"101 becomes a charade
when it challenges existing constitutional doctrines. Based on this reasoning, the court once again becomes the paternalistic guardian of the
electorate, not its faithful servant.
Although the express purpose of an initiative petition is to seek
the enactment of valid law," m it also serves a greater purpose. As a
94. Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, filed
with the Oklahoma Secretary
of State June 29, 1990.
95. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 42, at 306.
96. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 42, at 306.
97. In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Numbered
74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla. 1975).
98. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. 1992)
(stating that "voters are assured that their vote on a state question is meaningful"), cert denied,
113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
99. Id.at 11-12.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 12.
102. OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 34, §§ 1-25 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
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form of direct democracy, the initiative process is potentially the most
effective means of communicating core political speech, which is at
the heart of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 10 3 First
Amendment speech, especially core political speech exercised in the
pursuit of self-governance, does not have to be utilitarian." Regardless of whether it produces a tangible result, the intrinsic benefit of
political debate, especially in the context of direct democracy, occurs
in the free exchange of ideas as a proposal is propounded, attacked,
defended, and voted upon.
The central tenet of the court's "unnecessary" argument is that a
facially unconstitutional proposal cannot become valid law. For example, in reviewing Initiative Petition No. 349, the court cites Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey'015 as controllingconstitutional law on the subject
of abortion.106 Because the initiative in question did not support the
rights as construed in Casey'0 7 or in Roe v. Wade, 08 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that it was an unconstitutional petition. 0 9 The
court's definition of a "useless" or "unnecessary" election, therefore,0
appears to be one that challenges current constitutional orthodoxy."
It is ironic that the "law of the land""' used by the court to strike
an initiative petition in In re Initiative Petition No. 349112 was itself a

challenge to the then current state of law. When the Pennsylvania
legislature drafted the restrictions on abortion at the heart of Casey,"3
the United States Supreme Court had already declared similar restrictions unconstitutional." 4 Had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised judicial activism based on the rationale practiced in Oklahoma,
103. See eg., Teague, supra note 6, at 218.

104. See, e.g., Teague, supra note 6, at 218.
105. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
106. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Okla. 1992),
cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 1028 (1993).
107. Id. at 7. Casey reaffirms the holding from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that a
woman has a constitutionally protected right to make an independent choice to continue or to
terminate a pregnancy before viability. Id.

108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. In re Initiative PetitionNo. 349, 838 P.2d at 7.
110. See In re Initiative Petition No. 358, State Question No. 658, 870 P.2d 782, 790 (Okla.
concurring in result).
1994) (Opala, J.,
111. In re Initiative PetitionNo. 349, 838 P.2d at 7.
112. Id.
113. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
114. See generally Thornburgh v. Am. C. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Casey would never have been an issue because the legislation would
have been declared "useless" or "unnecessary."
However, the Casey analogy emphasizes one key difference between the Pennsylvania legislation and Initiative Petition No. 349: the
statute at issue in Casey was passed by a legislature while the proposed law at issue in Oklahoma was an initiative of the people.11
2. States' Rights
The majority decision in In re InitiativePetition No. 349 states the
proposition that First Amendment protections of core political speech
do not necessarily apply to the initiative process because that process
is a creation of the state, not the federal government. 116 The court
cites the provision of the Oklahoma Constitution which recognizes a
general right to initiative and referendum, 117 construing the provision
to mean that what Oklahoma has granted to the people (i.e. the right
to initiative), Oklahoma can take away (through pre-election judicial
review), regardless of First Amendment interests in political
speech.118 This argument is encompassed in the idea of "states'
119
rights."
The United States Supreme Court addressed the states' rights argument in Meyer v. Grant. 20 The State of Colorado contended that
"because the power of the initiative is a state-created right, it is free to
impose limitations on the exercise of that right."' 21 Rejecting this argument, the Court held that freedom of speech is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons
1' 22
by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.
Accordingly, the state lacks the power to limit political discussion
115. See In re Initiative PetitionNo. 349, 838 P.2d at 1.
116. Id. at 9 (stating that "[i]t
seems self-evident that the exercise of a non-federal right can
be conditioned by the same state cbnstitution that creates and confers it").
117. OKLA. CONsr. art. 2, § 1 (providing that "[a]ll
political power is inherent in the people
...and they have the right to alter or reform the [government] whenever the public good may
require it").
118. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
119. See generallyMeyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (discussing restriction of states' limitation on free speech).
120. IaL
121. Id.at 424. The State of Colorado had prohibited proponents of a petition from paying
persons to circulate the initiative petitions. Petitioners challenged this regulation on the grounds
that it interfered with the process of initiative and therefore, adversely affected the forum for
political debate. ld.
122. Id.at 420 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
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within the forum of the initiative process simply because it created the
forum. 123
When a petitioner placed the pre-election constitutional review
question squarely within the context of Meyer, 2 4 Oklahoma avoided
the United States Supreme Court's holding on states' rights by distinguishing its pre-election review from the controls exercised by the
State of Colorado."z Based on the concern for the free exercise of
"unfettered" political speech evinced in the Meyer decision, it seems
that the issue of pre-election constitutional review is in accord with
the holding of the Supreme Court.12 6 When the United States
Supreme Court held that the state creation of a power of initiative did
not include "the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in
1 7 it issued a directive to the states that the initiainitiative petitions,""
tive process is part of the privileged political speech which cannot be
burdened or cut short based on content.
3.

Striking Proposals Repugnant to the Constitution

The language of article 2, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, that changes enacted through initiative cannot be "repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States,"'12 has been used by the court
to strike at the content of an initiative petition. 2 9 The court construes
this limitation to mean that the Supreme Court of the state may review the petition for content that is "repugnant" under article 2, section 1.130 The court does not explain how the language grants the
court authority to strike an initiative prior to its enactment as a "repugnant" law. 3 ' Rather, the court adds this argument to its list of
justifications, using it to squelch political debate among the people on
the grounds that "the people have imposed upon themselves a restriction by approving Art. 2, § 1. ' 132 A more reasonable view dictates
123. Id. at 425.
124. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
125. Id.(arguing that "[h]ere, the procedural issue of paying circulators is not presented.
The manner in which the petition was circulated is not at issue").
126. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-21 (1988).
127. Id. at 425.
128. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 1.

129. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 14 (Simms, J.,
concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 15-28 (Wilson, J., dissenting in part; Opala, J.,
dissenting).
132. Id. at 14 (Simms, J., concurring).
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that the people approved the restriction believing that it would be applied in conjunction with the other limitations on government action,
namely separation of powers and judicial restraint. Unfortunately for
political speech and its proponents, that belief was undermined by the
court's extension of its own power.
4. The Court's Duty to Conduct Pre-Election Review
Perhaps as a means of sidestepping such criticism, the court has
adopted the argument that it is not only exercising the authority to
conduct pre-election review of initiative proposals but it is also fulfilling a responsibility to do so. 133 This argument implies that the court
has no choice but to engage in pre-election constitutional review of
initiatives.134 The court declares that its "constitutional duty" stems
from the decision in Rails v. Wyland.135 However, the doctrine expressed in Rails not only fails to justify the rampant judicial activism
practiced by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, it prohibits it.' 36 The language quoted in In re Initiative Petition No. 349 instructs the court to

adhere to the constitution as it protects the power of the people to
engage in direct democracy.' 37 The court has taken a very different
course of action. Since the Norman decision, the court has focused on
protecting the current state of the constitution by sacrificing core
political speech.' 3 8

133. Id. at 8 (stating that where "a ruling on the issue would prevent a useless election resulting in the enactment of an unconstitutional statute, this Court has the authority, as well as the
responsibility, to decide the matter").
134. Id.
135. 138 P. 158, 160 (Okla. 1914). The court held that:
The powers of the initiative and the referendum reserved to the people occupy a prominent place in the Constitution and laws of this state, and their act, when invoking such
powers, should be guarded by the courts, to the end that whatever is their due is kept
inviolate. In the exercise of such powers, it is necessary that the provisions of the Con.
stitution should be adhered to.
Id..
136. Id.
137. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 8.
138. See generally id. at 1; In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Numbered 74-1 and 74-2, 534 P.2d 3 (Okla. 1975).
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Post-Norman Rulings: Inherent Flaws Beyond the Court's
Justifications
1.

The Prudential Rule

The courts have no authority to hear constitutional challenges to
legislation before it becomes law. 13 9 This is a doctrine known as the
prudential rule of necessity. 4 0 The prudential rule dictates that courts
will not address constitutional issues in vacuo:'4 1 there must be a law
to review for facial unconstitutionality or a case or controversy to review for unconstitutionality as applied. 142 Accordingly, the court
should have no authority to review an initiative before it has been
voted into law. Such was the rule of Threadgillbefore it was unceremoniously abandoned by the court in Norman.43
One aspect of the prudential rule is its foundation in the legislative process.'" Judicial deference to the internal workings of another
branch of government may have more support than similar deference
to an initiative process among the people. 45 The legislative process
includes several levels of internal review whereby a proposal must
gain the approval of legislators in committees, hearings, debates, and
ultimately, in a vote by each house. 46 In contrast, a law passed
through initiative petition does not pass through the same legislative
process.' 47 The court has argued that this renders the initiative susceptible to pre-election review. 1' 8 Other commentators have gone so
far as to suggest that pre-election constitutional review is necessary to
49
protect individual rights "against the tyranny of the majority.'1
139. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772,782 (Okla. 1991)
(Opala, J., concurring in result).
140. 1i Under the prudential rule of necessity, constitutional issues must not be resolved in
advance of strict necessity. Id. at 782 n.4 (citing Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 732 P.2d
466, 467 n.3 (Okla. 1987); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937 (1983); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
concurring)).
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
141. Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 732 P.2d 466, 467 n.3 (Okla. 1987).
142. See In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 782 (Opala, J., concurring in result).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Teague, supra note 6, at 214.
Teague, supra note 6, at 214.
Teague, supra note 6, at 214.
Teague, supra note 6, at 214.
In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. 1992)

(stating that "many of the hurdles built into our legislative structure do not apply to initiatives
and referenda .. . [initiative petitions and the legislative process] are two very different
processes"), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1028 (1993).
149. Teague, supranote 6, at 215 (citing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrierto Racial Equality, 54 WAsH. L. REv.1, 28-29 (1978)).
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Regardless of the differences between the legislative and initiative processes, the latter includes safeguards which serve to protect
against oppressive or ill-considered petitions. 150 These include the
sine qua non requirements in the statutes and the single subject requirement, 151 which prevents potentially undesirable proposals15from
2
being hidden from the voter within a forest of other proposals.
2. Standing
Another aspect of the prudential rule is the related concept of
standing.153 A court cannot review the constitutionality of an issue
until a claimant appears with a legally cognizable interest and an actual or threatened injury. 4 Furthermore, the interest must be "direct, immediate, and substantial."' 55 When applied to a constitutional
claim, the threshold is one of justiciability,
asking whether the plaintiff
56
has asserted a case or controversy.
As Justice Opala has pointed out to the court, "[n]o showing of
actual or threatened injury can be made [by] a measure that is not
law."' 57 Specifically in the context of protests to initiative petitions,
Justice Opala has challenged pre-election review on the grounds that
the protestants are not plaintiffs with standing to bring a constitutional
claim.' Such a plaintiff must have a personal interest threatened by

150. Teague, supra note 6, at 215.
151. In re Initiative Petition No. 344, State Question No. 630,797 P.2d 326,330 (Okla.1990);
In re Initiative Petition No. 342, State Question No. 628, 797 P.2d 331, 333 (Okla. 1990).
152. Such "piggybacking" of proposals is common practice in legislative procedures and
lends credence to the sanctity of the initiative process.
153. "'Standing' is the legal right of a person to challenge the conduct of another in a judicial
forum." State ex rel Cartwright v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 653 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Okla. 1982); In
re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059,1062 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied,484 U.S. 1072 (1988).
154. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772, 783 (Okla. 1990)
(Opala, J., concurring in result).
155. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 21 & n.15 (Okla.
1992) (Opala, J.,
dissenting) (citing Underside v. Lathrop, Okla., 645 P.2d 514, 517 (Okla. 1982);
Democratic Party v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 274 n.13 (Okla. 1982)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1028
(1993).
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 21.
158. Id.at 22-24.
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the state. 159 Arguably, when the court addresses substantive constitutional issues in the pre-election state of a proposal, it is rendering an
advisory opinion rather than adjudicating a constitutional claim. 60
F. The Line of Defense Wavers
Beginning with his call for a return to the "abandoned case law of
yesteryear" in 1982,61 Justice Opala has been a steady voice of reason
in the post-Norman era of pre-election constitutional review. 62 Much
of the valuable commentary and criticism directed toward the majority decisions regarding pre-election constitutional review has taken
place in Justice Opala's concurrences and dissents. 63

159. Ld. at 24 (citing Oklahoma City News Broadcasters Ass'n v. Nigh, 683 P.2d 72, 78 n.2
(Okla. 1984)) (Opala, J., concurring in result) (stating that "[i]n a suit [against the Governor] for
accounting [of expenditures from his legislative mansion allowances] petitioners [news reporters]
would occupy the status of so-called 'non-Hohfeldian' plaintiffs, i.e. persons whose interest tendered for judicial vindication is neither personal nor proprietary") (alterations in original).
160. Teague, supra note 6, at 216 & n.123 (citing Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball and
Assocs., Inc., 540 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Okla. 1975)). The court is not to engage in issuing advisory
opinions under its own ruling.
161. In re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 649 P.2d 545, 554 (Okla. 1982)
(Opala, J. concurring).
162. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 18 (Okla. 1992)
(Opala, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993); In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State
Question No. 640, 820 P.2d 772, 781 (Okla. 1991) (Opala, J., concurring in result); In re Initiative
Petition No. 347, State Question No. 639, 813 P.2d 1019, 1037 (Okla. 1991) (Opala, J., concurring); In re Initiative Petition No. 342, State Question No. 628, 797 P.2d 331, 334 (Okla. 1990)
(Opala, J., dissenting); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627,796 P.2d 267,275
(Okla. 1990) (Opala, J., concurring in result); In re Initiative Petition No. 332, State Question
No. 598, 776 P.2d 556, 559 (Okla. 1989) (Opala, J., dissenting); In re Initiative Petition No. 315,
649 P.2d at 554 (Opala, J., concurring in result).
163. See, e.g., In re InitiativePetitionNo. 349, 838 P.2d at 18 (Opala, J., dissenting). The most
notable new voice speaking against the current state of pre-election judicial review of initiative
petitions also appeared in In re Initiative Petition No. 349 in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Wilson. Id. at 15 (Wilson, J., dissenting in part). Even though the majority opinion did not
address the issue directly, Justice Wilson's dissent focused on the separation of powers doctrine
embodied in the constitution. Id. at 16.
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Justice Opala has repeatedly voiced arguments against the use of
pre-election constitutional review of initiative petitions. 164 In the recent Supreme Court review of initiative petitions, 165 Justice Opala carried on this tradition of support for prudence in his separate
opinions. 6 He reaffirmed his call for a return to Threadgill,67 declared any judicial review invalid except for compliance with procedure, 68 and renounced the majority's imposition of "constitutional
orthodoxy on the lawmaking process."' 69
However, in a paragraph which recurs in two opinions, almost as
an afterthought to the bulk of his argument, Justice Opala conceded a
critical point to the majority. 170 The statement by Justice Opala that
the court is justified in reviewing and striking a proposed measure
where "constitutional jurisprudence" of a "firmly settled" nature "absolutely condemns" it,' 7' is tempered by the admonition that such review could only occur where "the protestants have standing to
164. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d at 18 (Opala, J., dissenting) (citing the
prudential rule, standing, the primary jurisdiction over the controversy belonging to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, and the invalid imposition of a standard of constitutional orthodoxy upon
proponents of initiative petitions); In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 781 (Opala, J.,
concurring in result) (arguing for a return to the prudential rule, alleging that the plaintiff in
question had no standing to challenge the pre-election petition, arguing that the guarantee
clause in question is not justiciable by even the United States Supreme Court); In re Initiative
Petition No. 347, 813 P.2d at 1037 (Opala, J., concurring) (arguing for a return to the prudential
rule as held in Threadgill,alleging the pre-election review of initiative petitions delays and burdens the initiative process, stating three categories for permissible review, none of which involve
reviewing the content of a petition prior to enactment); In re Initiative PetitionNo. 342, 797 P,2d
at 334 (Opala, J., dissenting); In re InitiativePetitionNo. 341, 796 P.2d at 275 (Opala, J., concurring in result) (reaffirming his call for a return to the holding in Threadgil); In re Initiative
Petition No. 332, 776 P.2d at 559 (Opala, J., dissenting) (reasserting his arguments from In re
InitiativePetition No. 315); In re Initiative PetitionNo. 315, 649 P.2d at 554 (Opala, J., concurring
in result) (arguing that the controversy was not justiciable due to lack of standing).
165. In re Initiative Petition No. 358, State Question No. 658, 870 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1994).
166. Id. at 788 (Opala, J., concurring in result).
167. Id
168. Id
169. d at 791 (Opala, J., concurring in result).
170. Id Justice Opala writes:
Only in the clearest case ofifnnly settled and stable constitutional jurisprudence that
absolutely condemns a proposed measure as facially impossible of enforcement, application or execution-and then only if the protestantshave standingto complain of constitutional infirmity-should this court ever undertake to trump an initiative petition
that is on its journey to the ballot box.
Id.
This language is an exact restatement of a paragraph from his dissent in In re Initiative
Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 19 (Okla. 1992) (Opala, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
171. In re Initiative Petition No. 358, State Question No. 658, 870 P.2d 782, 791 (Okla. 1994)
(Opala, J., concurring in result).
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complain of constitutional infirmity.' 172 For the most part, this argument is consistent with those related to standing and prudential review. 173 However, when Justice Opala concedes that facial
impossibility under the constitution will justify the pre-election constitutional review of an initiative petition,' 74 he severely diminishes the
argument which his dissents and concurrences have so eloquently kept
alive since In re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553.175
It does not matter that he surrounds the concession with the "standing" proviso' 7 6 and qualifiers such as, "only ... firmly settled and
stable constitutional jurisprudence."'17 7 The concession evinced in this
statement is that core political speech in the form of an initiative petition may be called in for review. Some commentators on the issue
have always contended that this is the proper result. 78 Nevertheless,
the principle that political speech in an initiative process must be free
from content-based interference by the state has been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court 1 79 and should be practiced by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Pre-election constitutional review of initiative petitions is an unnecessary and costly burden on core political speech. The United
States Supreme Court has held this to be true,' and the well-founded
principles of judicial restraint and separation of powers doctrine support its validity. Nevertheless, in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
poorly justified zeal to protect the citizenry from "costly and unnecessary" elections, and to protect the Constitution from the citizenry, the
sanctity of the initiative process has been lost to judicial activism. As
long as the Oklahoma Supreme Court continues to engage in this
practice, initiative petitions cannot fully serve their function as our
government's only form of direct democracy.
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